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The ‘three pillars of stagnation’:
challenges for air transport reform
CHR I S TOPHER F INDLAY
The University of Adelaide
DAV ID K. ROUND
The University of South Australia
Abstract : Various aspects of trade and investment in air transport services are
regulated by a series of bilateral agreements in which rights of market access are
exchanged. Industry commentators have identiﬁed this system and the associated
national ownership rules as well as the prevailing attitude of competition
authorities (on merger policy and on airport pricing) as the most important
factors limiting adjustment in the international air transport industry. These
‘pillars of stagnation’ are examined here. Features of the bilateral agreements in
aviation that are similar to those of other preferential trading agreements are
noted and linked to the slow pace of policy reform in this industry. The three
‘pillars ’ are not independent, and eﬀective liberalization of trade and investment
in air transport services depends on complementary regulatory reform. Options
are presented on ways in which these changes might be designed and introduced,
and in what sequence that might be done. Air transport services are currently
excluded from the WTO’s General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and
an important enquiry is how multilateral commitments recorded in the GATS
might support reform.
Introduction
The ‘three pillars of stagnation’ is a phrase used by Giovanni Bisignani, Director
General of the International Air Transport Association, to refer to the bilateral
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system for exchanging traﬃc rights in air transport, the associated national
ownership rules and the attitude of competition authorities. He regards these as
the most important factors limiting change and a return to proﬁtability in the
international air transport industry.1
Access to markets is negotiated bilaterally in this sector. This approach limits the
extent of free riding within those negotiations. However, the coverage of bilateral
agreements does not necessarily match the scope of the markets in which airlines
designated under such agreements compete. Changes in the competitive structure
of markets through route proliferation and higher levels of density have forced
adjustment on many carriers, and have led to some reform of the bilateral system.
The theme of this paper is that more extensive reform is valuable and that a
multilateral approach to its management is now likely to be eﬀective, despite the
traditional concern about free riding in aviation. There are both public policy and
political economy reasons for this, including the nature of the policy changes that
are important, the shift in industry opinion evident in Bisignani’s remarks, and the
stronger inﬂuence of new interest groups in policy choices in the sector.
Commentators have been heard to assert that extending the coverage of the
GATS to air transport ‘won’t be seen inmy lifetime’. Yet industry views are shifting.
Changes in the attitudes of those subject to regulation increase the likelihood of
reform. Other reformist interests in this sector are now stronger, including tourism
services suppliers as well as private airport operators and investors. Some
governments however remain concerned about liberalization, reﬂecting either
their perception of the interests of local airlines or their concern about the risk of
predatory behaviour by foreign governments or carriers in more open markets.
In this paper we review Bisignani’s assessment of the three pillars. We begin with
comments on the most important characteristics of the policy environment. We
note that most of the business activity of airlines is excluded from WTO agree-
ments. We review the industry’s recent proﬁtability and note results of research
which assesses the extent and impact of protection applying to trade and
investment in the industry. We note that, while relatively highly protected, civil
aviation records a poor proﬁt performance, and we discuss the implications of this
situation for airline interests in reform.
We also comment on the relative importance of each of the ‘three pillars ’ for
this situation, and then discuss diﬀerent ways in which the agreements and pro-
cesses of the WTO might be amended to make a contribution to reform of the air
transport sector.
The regulatory system and other impediments to trade and investment2
Trade and investment in air transport services is subject to a variety of impedi-
ments, some relating to ‘sins of commission’ by governments in the application of
1 http://www.iata.org/pressroom/speeches/2003-03-22-01.htm (accessed 16 September 2005).
2 This section is based on Findlay (2003) and on parts of Findlay and Goldstein (2004).
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their regulatory arrangements, and some to ‘sins of omission’ due to the lack of
policy responses to some problems.3 The nature of these impediments and the
treatment of air transport in theWTO are discussed in this section. We then turn to
a review of IATA DG Giovanni Bisignani’s three pillars.
Regulatory arrangements
The regulation of international trade in air transport services involves an elaborate
structure of bilateral agreements (there are over 3500 such agreements), which ﬁx
a set of rules to identify the airlines of the contracting parties with the rights to
ﬂy on each route, determine the capacity that can be provided by each of those
designated airlines, and limit the capacity that can be oﬀered by airlines from third
countries.
The system therefore imposes a set of country-speciﬁc quotas in each market,
where markets are deﬁned in terms of routes between pairs of countries and in
terms of the two-way traﬃc ﬂow. Competition on each route is limited to those
suppliers designated by the relevant bilateral air services agreements. When pri-
vately owned, eﬀective ownership and control of the designated carriers must rest
in the countries negotiating the agreement.4




. presence of natural persons.
Options relevant to air transport within the ﬁrst three modes of supply are listed in
Table 1. A bilateral agreement would aﬀect all options for cross-border supply
(option A) because they
1. put limits on access in option A1: the capacity available to carriers based in
one of the end points of a route is often restricted.
2. put limits on access in option A2: only those carriers allocated rights under the
bilateral agreement are allowed to pick up passengers on a route and rights of
access to third parties are usually tightly constrained.
3. ban A3: cabotage (point-to-point carriage of domestic passengers by inter-
national airlines) as part of an international network is not permitted.
A bilateral agreement would generally ban all options that depended on commer-
cial establishment by a foreign carrier, since the designation of a carrier based in a
3 Warren and Findlay (2000) provide further discussion of the types of ‘sin’.
4 Descriptions of the system is provided by the Australian Productivity Commision (1998) and WTO
(2000 and 2001a).
5 The distinction between cross-border supply and consumption abroad is not so clear for transport
services. An airline that picks up or sets down a customer at the customers’s own home base is regarded
here as involved in cross-border supply. Consumption abroad occurs when the customer is travelling
between points away from home.
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country which is a party to the agreement as having the right to ﬂy under that
agreement is usually restricted to those locally owned and controlled (option C: an
option like C3 might be sought by a carrier based in a high cost economy which
seeks to maintain its competitiveness).
The purchase of tickets oﬀshore by local consumers (option B) is outside the
scope of the local regulation, although that transaction is subject to regulation by
the end-point countries of the route.
The terms of market access by domestic suppliers also matter (items D and E).
Market access in the GATS refers to the terms of access applying to domestic
suppliers and not just those applying to foreign suppliers. A bilateral agreement
might permit designation of more than one domestic operator in mode D.
However option E is a matter for domestic policy.
The movement of people (the fourth mode of supply in the GATS), while
not shown in Table 1, is also important, for example. for the movement of
airline staﬀ or suppliers of complementary services. This mode is of interest in
Table 1. Modes of supply of international air transport
Mode of Supply Examples in air transport
Cross-border Supply A1 Cross-border supply on international routes (including a stop in
the home base): e.g. Malaysian Airlines operating out of Malaysia
picks up Australians on Malaysia-Australia routes
A2 Cross-Border supply on international routes (not including a stop
in the home base) e.g. Malaysian Airlines picks up Australians on
New Zealand–Australia routes (as part of sequence with an origin
or destination in Malaysia).
A3 Cross-border supply on domestic routes: e.g. Malaysian Airlines
carries Australians on domestic routes in Australia
Consumption Abroad B Consumption abroad on international routes: e.g. local consumers
buy tickets oﬀshore
Commercial Presence C1 Commercial presence adjacent to consumers to supply
international market: e.g. Malaysian Airlines establishes an
Australian operation to carry Australians (and others) on routes
to and from Australia
C2 Commercial presence adjacent to consumers to supply domestic
market; e.g. Malaysian Airlines establishes an Australian operation
to supply routes within Australia
C3 Commercial presence oﬀshore not adjacent to consumers:
e.g. Malaysian Airlines establishes a business in Indonesia to
carry Australians (and others) on routes to and from Australia
Market access by
domestic suppliers
D Home-based delivery to international market: e.g. Malaysian
Airlines operates on routes to and from Malaysia
E Home-based delivery to domestic market: e.g. Malaysian Airlines
operates on routes within Malaysia
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this industry to developing economy exporters of labour services and also to
developed economies where businesses adjust their operations in response to
competition.
The international regulatory arrangements restrict market access, by both
domestic and foreign carriers. The most-favoured nation principle (MFN) is not
satisﬁed since there is discrimination between foreign suppliers. Nor is the prin-
ciple of national treatment satisﬁed since foreign and domestic airlines operate
under diﬀerent conditions, for example in terms of access to domestic markets or
ownership conditions.6
Market access is now generally exchanged in a series of bilateral agreements
and these refer to, or deﬁne implicitly, the ‘freedoms of the air ’. The freedoms
of the air can be matched with the modes of delivery of air transport
services (Table 2). The major omissions among the freedoms of air are those modes
related to commercial presence for servicing international routes (the C options
in Table 1).
Table 2. Freedoms of the air and the modes of supply
Freedom
of the air Deﬁnition
Mode of supply
(refer Table 1)
First To overﬂy one country en-route to another n.a.
Second To make a technical stop in another country n.a.
Third To carry freight and passengers from the home country
to another country
A1, D
Fourth To carry freight and passengers to the home country
from another country
A1, D
Fifth To carry freight and passengers between two countries by an
airline of a third country on a route with an origin or destination
in its home country
A2
Sixth To carry freight and passengers between two countries by an




Seventh To carry freight and passengers between two countries by an
airline of a third country on a route with no connection in
its home country
A2
Eighth To carry freight and passengers within a country by an airline of




Ninth To carry freight and passengers within a foreign country
with no connection in the home country. [True domestic]
C2 or A3
6 This example assumes that the 8th and 9th freedoms ie cabotage and ‘true domestic’ are suﬃciently
alike.
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Air transport in the WTO7
Commitments associated with air transport under the WTO’s General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS) only apply to three ancillary services – aircraft repair
and maintenance, selling and marketing, and computer reservation systems.
An annex to the agreement excluded consideration of traﬃc rights and services
related to traﬃc rights under the GATS. In 2001, the WTO resumed its mandated
review of the Annex on Air Transport Services and adopted the guidelines,
procedures and work programme for the negotiations on services, including a
number of air transport and tourism proposals (ICAO 2002). Proposals for
additions to the Annex on Air Transport Services submitted by Members to
the Council on Trade in Services (CTS) included ground-handling services ; airport
management services ; leasing or rental services of aircraft without operator;
and services auxiliary to all modes of transport when delivered in an air
transport context.8 Airlines may want to include ground services in the Annex to
try to create more competitive markets for their provision. Also private investors in
airports, now more common, may prefer to widen the coverage of the Annex to
include airport management services. However, the 2001 review stalled and ended
without conclusion in November 2003, and another was to begin later in 2005.9
At the same time, there are general negotiations on services in progress in
the WTO and those economies with a strong interest have the option to return
to some speciﬁc air transport issues through those negotiations, for example
proposing the coverage and liberalization of airport services and ground handling.
The presence of another international organization with jurisdiction in the ﬁeld
has complicated the negotiations. The International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO, a UN body) has requested the WTO to develop a Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) to strengthen cooperation and to help deﬁne their respective
roles.10 There has also been discussion in the WTO of a draft GATS Annex on
Tourism. A proposal was discussed at the Council on Trade in Services that en-
visages access to air transport infrastructure and related services on a non-
discriminatory basis in addition to concerns for potential regulatory overlap
on certain aspects of air transport.11
The first pillar : bilateral restrictions
Bilateral agreements restrict entry into air transport markets, thereby increasing
prices. They could also have the eﬀects of creating rents for incumbents or, as
7 The discussion of the treatment of air transport in the GATS is extracted from Findlay and Goldstein
(2004).
8 Hubner and Sauve´ (2001: 980 and Table 1) examine these proposals.
9 The outcome of the review is reported in WTO (2003), paragraphs 12–118.
10 Abeyratne (2001) provides a more detailed discussion of the role of ICAO and its relationship with
the WTO.
11 For more details of the proposed annex and commentary on it, see papers available at http://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/symp_tourism_serv_feb01_e.htm (accessed 16 September 2005).
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discussed further below, the impediments could also increase costs. Doove,
Gabbitas, Nguyen-Hong, and Owen (2001) extended earlier OECD work
(Gonenc and Nicoletti, 2001) on the impact the agreements on prices. They
calculated an index of restrictiveness of air transport policy which included:
. Designation requirements (single, multiple or no restriction)
. Capacity regulation (predetermined, free determination, other formulas)
. Price regulation (various formulas, no requirement)
. Treatment of non-scheduled services
In the index calculation, each component accounted for between 22 and 27 per-
cent of the score.12 Components were scored between zero and one, with lower
scores corresponding to more liberal regimes, according to the assessments of the
research team members. The weighted index value therefore also ranged between
0 and 1.
Figure 1 shows the index values for the Asia Paciﬁc economies. The ﬁgure
illustrates the wide variation in policy regimes in the region but also shows the
relatively restricted nature of the regimes. Of the economies in Figure 1, only the
US and New Zealand show a score of less than 0.4. In comparison, apart from
Switzerland, the index values for the European countries are all less than 0.4
(for example the UK index value is 0.30 and that for Ireland is 0.21 with Portugal
the lowest at 0.14).
Restrictions of the type captured in the index have had a signiﬁcant impact on
airfares. Discount level fares in the Asia Paciﬁc region are estimated to be 12 per
cent and 22 per cent higher in the region because of the presence of the restrictions
(Doove et al. 2001, Table 2.3). Further regulatory reform in this sector would
therefore lead to signiﬁcant price reductions, including in developing countries.
























































Source : Doove et al., 2001.
12 These weights are derived from a factor analysis of the variation in the components of the index. See
Gonenc and Nicoletti (2001).
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Rent creating or cost increasing?
IATA estimates the net ﬁnancial result for its members for the period 2001–2005
will be a net loss of US$40b.13 Some carriers are earning substantial proﬁts, given
their locational, ﬁnancial, structural, or regulatory advantages. However, appar-
ently, this is generally not the case. In the light of the failure of regulated ﬁrms
to beneﬁt signiﬁcantly, the argument for reform being made in the industry
(and which we represent by DG Bisignani’s comments) is not surprising.
Where did the rents go? Some are used up by high cost operators, which con-
tinue to survive under the protection of the regulatory system. Their costs are high
either because of the relative prices they pay for inputs, or because they operate
at levels below those possible by airlines located on the industry ‘frontier ’. The
data reported by Oum and Yu (1998) show the extent of variation in costs between
operators. Part of this variation in costs could reﬂect the rents that are absorbed
by the suppliers of inputs, particularly labour, by the airlines and, as discussed
further below, by the providers of infrastructure services. The barriers to entry
associated with regulation also encourage rent-seeking behaviour by input
providers who have suﬃcient bargaining power.
Reform that has occurred within the regulatory system has increased the levels
of competition. The relaxation of restrictions on entry and the designation of more
than one carrier, both changes that are now common, have contributed to
competition. The density of networks has increased, providing in many cases a
larger number of substitute routings between any two end points. Rents are
absorbed in this setting by the deliberate creation of excess capacity to deter entry,
or by competitive pressures from entrants which lead incumbents to renew their
ﬂeets sooner than otherwise.
The restrictions imposed by the regulatory system can also increase costs.
Airlines in the current regulatory environment have to construct their networks
through a constellation of bilateral agreements. Some pairs of cities that might be
served in an eﬃcient network cannot be served because of the restrictions on
market access associated with the bilateral agreements. Alliances with other
carriers are one response to this problem but they may be a second-best solution
because of the many diﬀerent types of transactions costs incurred.14
Johnson et al. (2000) modelled the impact of more liberal arrangements in the
sector. They found signiﬁcant cost savings due to competition, which led to higher
productivity and to the redesign of networks in more open markets. They found
that the former eﬀect was much bigger than the latter and that all the gains were
passed on to consumers. Contrary to industry expectations, very little of the gain
was retained by the airlines.
13 http://www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/2005-04-04-02.htm (accessed 30 April 2005).
14 Cooperative arrangements between carriers are reviewed in WTO (2001b). Oum, Park and Zhang
(2000) provide an analysis of alliances.
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The second pillar : ownership restrictions
Airline agreements are similar to preferential trading agreements and require a rule
to establish which businesses are eligible for access to the terms of the agreement,
that is, a ‘rule of origin’. The ‘ownership and control’ rule is a critical component
of the bilateral agreement for this reason.
Bisignani stresses that the constraints on airline ownership are an impediment to
consolidation and to better ﬁnancial performance in the industry:
Airlines should be free to merge and approach the international ﬁnancial markets
for capital. The wave of globalization must eliminate national ownership limits
wherever they represent an obstacle to development. These limits are denying
airlines the freedom of action given to all other businesses. Some states may wish
to keep a ‘golden share’ to make sure their national interests are taken into
account. Fine! We simply ask these states not to create obstacles for those who
wish to liberalize further. They can decide their own timing but they should not
be allowed to stop the process. Freedom is really what our industry needs the
most.15
The ownership rules inhibit the response of incumbent carriers to challenges
from competitors. Their concern about these rules has been made more intense
by the emergence of a new business model in air transport, that of the low cost
carriers. The incumbent full service operators can respond to that threat by
stressing their network advantages and will be assisted by a relaxation of owner-
ship rules.
Rules on ownership inhibit new entrants into the business. Costs of operation
in air transport vary between countries (Oum and Yu, 1998) and developing
economies are internationally competitive in some or all parts of the business.
Their areas of specialization are likely to evolve as they develop, for example,
shifting from back oﬃce functions to ﬂying operations or engineering, as their
relative labour costs increase. Their capacity to enter markets for air transport
services, or to enter markets for inputs to air transport, is increased by foreign
investment in air transport that they host, but the regulatory system impedes that
investment.
The third pillar : competition policy problems
Competition policy issues in air transport markets include the response by domi-
nant incumbents to entry by new competitors, abuse of market power by suppliers
of services to airlines, provision of subsidies, and the application of merger policy.
The eﬀects of airline anti-competitive conduct and of public policy decisions in air
transport markets cross over jurisdictional boundaries.
15 http://www.iata.org/pressroom/speeches/2003-03-22-01.htm (accessed 14 February 2004).
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Anti-competitive behaviour by incumbents in a market is a special problem
where there is no recourse to a regulatory process to resolve disputes about these
behaviours. They might include abuse of control of services linked to facilities
which are essential to the provision of the service, such as airports and
other aspects of these issues which were listed in the ‘doing business ’ section
above. Impediments might also be the result of the use of predatory pricing by
incumbents, or of deliberate attempts by incumbents to raise the costs of rivals or
new entrants.
The abuse of power by services providers to airlines is another issue, the
importance of which is apparent in the responses to an industry survey which are
summarized in Table 3. The survey covered all-cargo operators, but the responses
are relevant to both passenger and cargo operators. The terms on which airlines
have access to complementary services, including those which they intend to
provide themselves, are a common theme in the responses.
DG Bisignani has expressed his concern about airline exposure to the market
power of infrastructure providers :
The airlines are vigorously competing with each other. While this battle
continues, they are also the victims of monopoly operators of aviation infra-
structure: airports and air traﬃc management (ATM) companies. The liberal-
ization process has failed to provide a level playing ﬁeld for all parties in the civil
aviation sector. Regulators have not protected the airlines and their passengers
from the monopoly infrastructure providers. The marketplace discipline is not
there to force airports and ATM companies to be eﬃcient. Some may be tempted
to take it easy. They are charging the cost of their ineﬃciency to the airlines and
their customers. And this must end. Airlines can no longer pay for their inef-
ﬁciency. As monopolies, and often, private monopolies, they can easily abuse that
position.16
Bisignani also refers to ‘dogmatic competition policies (that) also restrict our
freedom’.17 He observes that there are strong competitive forces in the industry,
including from the new low-cost carriers. Despite this he notes that regulatory
decisions on mergers or alliances are taking a long time and that ‘competition
authorities, all over the world seem to be over cautious with air transport ’. He
goes on to ask:
What other global business is more fragmented than air transport? Where are the
multi-national players, the Daimler-Chrysler’s or the Pharmacia-Upjohn’s of air
transport? Some industries requiring large investments are ﬁercely competitive
even with just a few very large players. In spite of that, most airline alliance
16 http://www.iata.org/pressroom/speeches/2003-03-22-01.htm (accessed 14 February 2004).
17 The origins of the bilateral agreements were in the concern that countries might use their control
over access to their air space to impede entry by airlines from other countries (Findlay, 1985). That
concern about a country’s abuse of its regulatory power is now less signiﬁcant and the industry comments
suggest less important than policy on mergers and on access to infrastructure.
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projects, or the few merger attempts face long delays_We need the economies
of scale that mergers or acquisitions can provide with the proper competition
supervision. Here again, the regulators must take up the challenge of change!18
Subsidies and state aid are other important talking points. The EU has proposed to
take countervailing action against airlines with extensive state support19 and has
also recently ruled against subsidies provided by regional airports to low cost
Table 3. Impediments to trade and investment in air transport services
Government regulation at foreign airports
Burdensome legal and administrative arrangements
Diﬃculty obtaining ﬂight authorization permits
Prohibitions against ﬂying during certain hours
Ineﬃcient take-oﬀ or landing slots at congested airports
Operations restricted to less desirable airports
Discriminatory taxes
Excessive ﬁnes for violation of regulations
Problems of converting or remitting currency
Excessive taxes
Excessive customs duties on purchased inputs
Cargo sector issues, such as restrictions on multimodal services, customs delays, etc.
Policies and services at foreign airports
Excessive landing fees
Discriminatory landing fees
Discriminatory payment terms (for example, currency in which fees must be paid)
Excessive fuel prices
Discriminatory fuel prices
Fees for which no service is provided
Problems with maintenance and technical support (for example, inability to secure the services required to
operate eﬃciently or inability to operate an airline’s own support services)





Cargo handling problems (for example, access to warehousing)
Other problems with ground handling (for example, inability to secure the services required to operate
eﬃciently or inability to operate an airlines’ own ground handling services)
Local marketing and distribution
Restrictions on local distribution networks
Restrictions on operations of sales businesses (for example, staﬃng, oﬃces)
Source : Adapted from Tables A3–A6 in WTO (2001d).
18 http://www.iata.org/pressroom/speeches/2003-03-22-01.htm (accessed 14 February 2004).
19 http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/2002/2002013.htm (accessed 14 February 2004).
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carriers, which reﬂect the diﬀerent choices of strategies adopted by airports with
diﬀerent degrees of market power.20
Competition policy choices made in any one country – for example, a merger
decision by one regulator – could aﬀect competition in markets in other econom-
ies. An access regime applied in one market could aﬀect entry conditions in others.
Findlay and Round (2003) ﬁnd that diﬀerences of opinion between countries could
arise on the same policy issue, perhaps for political economy reasons, or because of
the diﬀerences in institutional capacity and the diﬀerent attitudes taken to the costs
of errors in decision making.21 They suggest that a country at an earlier stage of
development may be more willing to accept proposals which turn out to diminish
the competitive process, since the assessment of policy makers in that economy
may be that the costs of that type of error are short-lived. This may not necessarily
be the case. However reducing this error would consume a substantial quantity of
relatively scarce policy-making capacity.
A further source of diﬀerences of opinion can arise from the methodology
employed. Greater weight could be placed on building markets which are eﬃcient
in dynamic terms, that is a behavioural approach, compared with a relatively static
analysis of the immediate impacts of a proposal to merge or to engage in some
other cooperative conduct. The former methodology is also more complex and
detailed and can also lead to diﬀerent assessments of outcomes compared with
those based solely on static considerations. The IATA view is apparently that
policy makers should adopt the dynamic methodology, by considering the longer-
run level of competition in markets. IATA may expect this methodology would
lead them to accept more merger proposals than they do now. This methodology
is more likely to emerge as experience accumulates in the competition policy
authority.
An example occurred in Australia, where the Australian Competition Tribunal
overturned a decision of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
that denied Qantas and Air New Zealand the ability to form a strategic alliance
and for Qantas to take a signiﬁcant equity ownership of Air New Zealand.
The Tribunal made its decision largely on the basis of expected future levels of
competition in the relevant markets, especially the trans-Tasman market, and used
a dynamic and behavioural assessment framework.22
20 ‘Whinge Air’, The Economist, 7 February 2004.
21 There are two types of errors in assessing a merger for example. One is that a merger will be denied
that would not have had anti-competitive eﬀects. Another is that a merger will be approved which does
have anti-competitive eﬀects. Lack of resources available to competition authorities to test applications
may increase the risk of the second error. Policy makers in a developing country may accept that risk, in
return for the lower costs of administration (and in the expectation that any economic proﬁts earned
would attract further entry in the long run).
22 See Qantas Airways Limited [2004] ACompT 9; (2004) ATPR 42-027; ﬁnal reasons delivered 16
May 2005.
262 C. F INDLAY AND D. K. ROUND
Situations in which there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences of opinion could prompt
developed countries to oﬀer programs of ‘capacity building’, that is, cooperative
work to share the experience on the application of various methodologies with
the institutions at earlier stages of development. However, as Round (2002)
explains, the convergence of the design of competition policy and the removal of
the diﬀerences of opinion in its application both depend on the development of the
‘culture of competition’ and of the appreciation of its contribution to growth,
eﬃciency, and social welfare.
Next steps
What IATA DG Bisignani regards as hesitation by competition policy regulators
(for example, in response to merger proposals) may reﬂect their concerns about
the consequences of the barriers to entry associated with the bilateral regulatory
system. Relaxation of its rules may also relax the attitude of competitor regulators.
Even so, competition policy concerns will remain and, as Bisignani himself puts
it, ‘ the paradox is that eﬀective liberalization needs eﬀective regulation’.
How might these changes be designed and introduced, in what sequence, and
howmight the WTO and its processes assist? Hubner and Sauve´ (2001) discuss the
prospects of including the air transport sector in commitments under the GATS.
They stress that making commitments under the GATS does not necessarily imply
liberalization, nor does it require any particular regulatory reform. However they
note countries who commit to MFN may become vulnerable to predatory attacks
by those who do not do so (p. 977). They also observe that, despite the safeguards
which the GATS approach oﬀers, governments may be reluctant to follow this
path without ‘some kind of protection while the industry globally prepares itself
for change’ (p. 978).
Before turning to examine reform within the WTO, we note two other paths to
reform, one which is reform within the existing bilateral system itself and another
which is reform by plurilateral agreement.
Bilateral reform
Reform within the existing bilaterals is now common, for example relaxation of
capacity controls and the designation of more than one carrier to operate services.
However reform evident to date within the bilateral system does not resolve all of
the problems identiﬁed and associated with Bisignani’s three pillars of stagnation.
Resolving the issues of the three pillars also requires attention to ownership
rules. Further reform on ownership rules is possible within the bilateral system.
Examples include the emergence of a consensus on the interpretation of ‘owner-
ship and control ’ (for example, a lower threshold level of local equity), movement
to recognition of all ownership from a group of countries (for example, ASEAN
members and their trading partners accept the designation of any airline with
suﬃcient ownership by nationals from any ASEAN country), or the adoption
The ‘three pillars of stagnation’ 263
of new draft text such as that proposed by ICAO, which is discussed below. The
most liberal form of designation would be that suﬃcient only to permit the
application of technical regulation to the operator. The commercial pressures
identiﬁed earlier may direct the evolution of bilateral agreements and ultimately
lead to the relaxation of the ‘rule of origin’ found in those agreements in a manner
which undoes their restrictive eﬀect. However the pace of change would
most likely be slow given the requirement for explicit agreement by each trading
partner.
Bilateral agreements do contain some provisions for dealing with complaints
about ‘doing business ’ matters, but resolving the issues of the three pillars also
requires attention to competition policy concerns, and to matters beyond those
usually handled within bilateral agreements.
Plurilateral reform
Guidance on a plurilateral approach is available from the report commissioned by
the WTO Director General from a Consultative Board on ‘The Future of the
WTO’ (WTO, 2005). Use of plurilateral agreements is one option examined in
that report. A small group could develop a plurilateral agreement amongst them-
selves and invite others to join on the same terms (a ‘club’ approach), or the whole
of the WTOmembership could negotiate an agreement from which some members
opt out if they wish.
Plurilateral agreements are used in air transport markets. There are examples in
Europe23 and among a group of APEC members.24 A plurilateral agreement might
emerge from negotiations on air transport market access between Europe and the
US.25 However, plurilateral structures do not necessarily build up to global free
trade, either because of inconsistencies in their architecture26 or because of the new
interests they create which impede extension of their membership.27 Plurilateral
agreements applied to one sector are even less likely to make progress towards
liberalization.
Multilateral reform
Hubner and Sauve´ (2001) suggest that the aviation sector could be divided into
two parts, the ﬁrst related to the Freedoms of the Air and the second ‘all other
components of air transport, including for example ownership and control,
23 The EU arrangements are summarised at http://europa.eu.int/comm/transport/air/international/
dev_en.htm (accessed 16 February 2005).
24 See the Multilateral Agreement on the Liberalization of International Air Transportation
(MALIAT), at http://www.maliat.govt.nz/ (accessed 16 September 2005).
25 Talks were resumed in September 2005 but sticking points in the discussion are the US position on a
cap on 49% foreign owernship of US airlines, and limits on foreign carrier access to domestic routes. See
http://www.atwonline.com/news/other.html?issueDate=9/12/2005 (accessed 16 September 2005).
26 Findlay (2003) identiﬁes a number of problems in the MALIAT model.
27 Andriamananjara (2002, 2003), using a model relevant to air transport markets, explains why
plurilateral groups would eventually close entry to new members.
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ground-based and reservation services, etc ’ (p. 979). Members who reach an
Understanding on the ﬁrst component and all those who subscribe to the
Understanding would exchange rights among themselves according to the core
provisions of the GATS. We make a speciﬁc suggestion about how the
Understanding might be constructed and we argue for additional commitments
with respect to the remaining ‘pillars of stagnation’, that is, ownership and
competition policy. We begin with the latter.
Domestic regulation, competition policy and cross-border supply
The GATS contains provisions with respect to monopolies and anti-competitive
behaviour, as well as domestic regulation. In telecommunications, Members
decided that explicit regulatory principles should be adopted. The Reference Paper
on Basic Telecommunications is a result of this approach. That Paper includes a
section on competitive safeguards. A similar approach is valuable here, and
guidance for developing a paper that is relevant to air transport is available from
ICAO, which has drafted ‘a model clause on competition safeguards’ which lists a
number of behaviours that may be anti-competitive in air transport markets. The
ICAO model clause also provides for both consultations and dispute resolution
with respect to such conduct.28 The ICAO clause could be combined with other
material into a Reference Paper on Air Transport Services. Clauses from the
Reference Paper on Basic Telecommunications which are relevant to air transport
could be added, for example those on transparency, the independence of
regulators, and allocation of scarce resources (which is relevant to slot allocation
systems at congested airports). Other ICAO codes, for example on airport pricing,
may also be relevant. The Paper would therefore include both principles to
be applied to domestic regulation and in some cases detail of the practices of
international cooperation (particularly dispute settlement).29 Members would be
invited to sign on to the Reference Paper, in conjunction with their commitments
on trade and investment liberalization, as explained below.
Bilateral agreements might be retained to manage only the relationships with
non-signatories to the Reference Paper (that is, applying to ﬂights originating in
or bound for the territory of the non-signatories). But once a non-signatory
changes its position on the new Reference Paper, its bilateral agreements with
other signatories would cease to operate.
Members would also have to list any exceptions to their commitments, that is
provide a negative list of those activities not covered. This list might initially be
dominated by cabotage but at least in that case the matter would be ‘on the table ’
for further negotiation in a multi-sector setting.
28 See at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/atb/atconf5/docs/ATConf5_conclusions_en.pdf or http://
www.iata.org/NR/ContentConnector/CS2000/Siteinterface/sites/mgr/ﬁle/Consolidated_Conclusions_
ATConf5_31_March.pdf (accessed 1 May 2005).
29 Another option is to develop a Reference Paper which applies to all network industries, and an
example has been drafted by Nikomborirak and Seraﬁca (2004).
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The concern has been that, if a country opens its own markets to cross-border
supply, it loses the bargaining power to protect the interests of its own carriers
when they seek to ﬂy into other countries. These rights were secured under bilat-
eral agreements. The Reference Paper just discussed provides a degree of security
with respect to such matters by its treatment of anti-competitive conduct.
Members might therefore be more prepared to make available this form of market
opening to those others who have conﬁrmed that they have signed on to the
proposed Reference Paper. This condition would be simple to schedule and regular
adjustments to lists of eligible trading partners in each Member’s GATS schedule
could be avoided by making a commitment in this form.
Ownership
Relaxation of rules on the establishment of local operations by foreign carriers also
contributes to more open markets. The spirit of the reform in this direction is that
(to quote Bisignani) ‘we simply ask (some) states not to create obstacles for those
who wish to liberalize further’. In that spirit, a Member could schedule new liberal
rules on rights of establishment that are relevant to ﬂying operations, including
those within local markets (exceptions could also be listed). Trading partners may
schedule less liberal rules, but that is a matter for their own assessment and, if
necessary, negotiation. All Members could be involved in the design of scheduling
conventions or models, even if not all of them immediately adopted the most
liberal versions.
As to the form of these new liberal commitments, the industry itself has
suggested new rules of ownership. The report of an ICAO conference meeting in
2003 reﬂects the positions put forward by the airlines themselves (as presented
by IATA) on liberalizing national ownership and control rules and separating
commercial ownership from regulatory control.30 The model clause on designation
proposed by ICAO includes the following:
Article X: Designation and Authorization
1. Each Party shall have the right to designate in writing to the other Party [an
airline] [one or more airlines] [as many airlines as it wishes] to operate the
agreed services [in accordance with this Agreement] and to withdraw or alter
such designation.
2. On receipt of such a designation, and of application from the designated
airline, in the form and manner prescribed for operating authorization [and
technical permission], each Party shall grant the appropriate operating
authorization with minimum procedural delay, provided that:
30 Consolidated Conclusions, Model Clauses, Recommendations and Declaration of Principles,
available at http://www.icao.int/icao/en/atb/atconf5/docs/ATConf5_conclusions_en.pdf. The conference
also endorsed the multilateral interline system and the existing slot allocation process. See also Chang and
Williams (2001) for a discussion of options for changes in ownership rules.
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. the designated airline has its principal place of business [and permanent
residence] in the territory of the designating Party;
. the Party designating the airline has and maintains eﬀective regulatory control
of the airline;
. the Party designating the airline is in compliance with the provisions set forth
in Article – (Safety) and Article – (Aviation security) ; and
. the designated airline is qualiﬁed to meet other conditions prescribed under the
laws and regulations normally applied to the operation of international air
transport services by the Party receiving the designation.
Diﬀerent criteria can be used to establish ‘principal place of business’ as required in
this clause. These include the presence of an establishment of the enterprise, the
location of incorporation, the extent of operations and physical facilities, the
payment of income tax, the registration of aircraft, and the employment of na-
tionals in management and operations. These deﬁnitions could apply to airline
operations owned and controlled by nationals of economies which are not signa-
tories to an agreement.31
In a free trade regime the identity of the provider is irrelevant, except that the
right to ﬂy would depend on compliance with regulation on technical matters.
These matters are also referred to in the ICAO model clause, where designated
airlines must have valid operating licenses and meet safety and security standards.
But these terms are not discriminatory if as ICAO suggests the relevant standards
on which the license would be based are those operating world-wide.
The ICAO draft clause also refers to ‘ﬁnancial health’ and ‘assurance of service’
but these terms can be interpreted as references to consumer protection issues
rather than as impediments to trade and investment. Consumer protection is a
special issue in these forms of international trade where the consumer is located in
one country and the producer is based in another (Round and Tustin, 2005). It is
not easy for a consumer in one country to take action against a producer in
another: information on how to do so may not be readily available, and the search
costs of obtaining the necessary information, and then using it, could be prohibi-
tive. Regulators are often powerless to seek redress due to lack of formal processes
to govern such actions between the countries.
Sequence of events
The sequence of events is summarized in Figure 2, where negotiating options
between two countries A and B are presented. If A does not adopt the Reference
Paper then whatever B does the bilateral is retained. If A adopts the Reference
Paper and schedules the associated GATS commitments, then the bilateral is
dropped if B matches the actions of A, and otherwise it is retained.
31 Findlay, Forsyth and King (2005) discuss the application of a variety of relatively liberal rules of
origin in the Paciﬁc Islands Air Services Agreement of 2003 (see also http://www.forumsec.org.fj/division/
DEPD/infra/aviation/PIASA_ﬁnal%2004.pdf, access 16 September 2005).
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A process of review like that applied to the current Annex continues to be
important, since, as just suggested, MFN exemptions are to be scheduled.32
Further, a review of trends in rules on establishment (and therefore designation)
would also be important to encourage convergence to open arrangements. Ideally
a path of evolution of these rules should be speciﬁed in advance and regular
monitoring should be undertaken to establish the distribution of the Membership
among the various options, and of their progress towards free trade and invest-
ment in air transport services. This is important to deal with the risk that countries
might schedule in the GATS commitments on ownership that are less liberal
than those in their bilaterals : the most liberal of those could be adopted as the
benchmark for scheduled commitments in GATS.
Conclusion
Rights of access to air transport markets are exchanged under a system of bilateral
agreements. Despite the adjustment pressures faced by incumbent airlines, this
system has been slow to change. Its costs include a loss of the gains from trade and
investment in this sector. The costs of the current system appear to be evident to
the airlines themselves. While some reform has occurred within the bilateral
system, more extensive changes are valuable and possible. The public policy gains
from such changes and the apparent shift in the political economy of policy
making in the sector all suggest a multilateral approach to reform can be eﬀective.
While industry attitudes are shifting, governments prepared to liberalize remain
concerned about the risk of predatory behaviour by airlines of their trading part-
ners who have not committed to reform. The transition from the bilateral system
to a GATS-based process proposed here is built on the adoption of a new















32 New MFN exemptions in GATS require a waiver under Article IX:3 of the WTO Agreement.
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Reference Paper on Air Transport Services and the scheduling of new commit-
ments on air transport.
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